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Hegel's Critique of
Kantian Practical Reason

PHILIP J. KAIN
Santa Clara University
Santa Clara, CA 95053
USA

While many philosophers have found Hegel's critique of Kantian ethics to be interesting in
certain respects, overall most tend to nd it rather shallow and to think that Hegel either
misunderstands Kant’s thought or has a rather crude understanding of it. For example, in
examining the last two sections of Chapter V of the Phenomenology— "Reason as Lawgiver" and
"Reason as Testing Laws" (where we get an extended critique of the categorical
1

imperative)—Lauer nds Hegel's treatment to be truncated and inadequate. The only trouble,

1

Notes
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though, is that like most other readers of the Phenomenology, Lauer does not recognize that
Hegel had been examining and criticizing Kantian ethics throughout a much greater part
of—indeed, more than half of—Chapter V. Once we do understand this, I think we must
concede that Hegel's treatment is hardly truncated and that it cannot be described as shallow or
inadequate. I will try to show that Hegel demonstrates a rather sophisticated understanding of,
and gives a serious and thorough critique of, Kantian practical reason.
A good part of the problem here is due to Hegel's own obscurity. The Phenomenology is
lled with veiled allusions to other texts. Lauer thinks we should be slow in concluding just
what texts Hegel is actually referring to. He suggests that Hegel may not have been sure himself
2

or that he wanted to refer to an amalgam of positions. This point is well taken. Hegel's
allusions are not speci c and precise. They are general, open, even symbolic—as if they were
trying to refer to as much as possible. Thus, I very de nitely do not want to imply that Hegel
was signi cantly in uenced by and alludes to Kant and not other philosophers. Nor do I want
to suggest that by establishing a connection to Kant we will be able to explain everything that is
going on in Hegel's text. Nevertheless, I do think that to understand Hegel we simply must begin

Q. Lauer, S.J., A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York: Fordham
University Press, 1976), 172.
2

Lauer, 42. See also, R.B. Pippin, Hegel's Idealism: The Satisfactions of

Self-Consciousness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 118. Also, M.S. Gram,
“Moral and Literary Ideals in Hegel’s Critique of ‘The Moral View of the World,’” CLIO, 7 (1978),
376.
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to understand who and what he is alluding to. I want to try to show that among all the other
things that Hegel is doing in Chapter V he is criticizing Kant's ethics and that only when we see
this will Hegel's thought start to come into focus, become clear and philosophically interesting,
and provide us with a serious critique of Kantian ethical theory.

I
Hegel wants to claim that Kant’s account of morality is inadequate and that to give an adequate
account we must move to Sittlichkeit. In the section entitled "The Actualization of Rational
Self-Consciousness Through Its Own Activity," Hegel begins to explain his concept of
3

Sittlichkeit. Reason, Hegel claims, is actualized only in a free nation. Only there can we nd
reason objectively realized in the customs, traditions, practices, laws, and institutions of a people.
The citizens pursue their purposes, objectify themselves in their institutions, and see themselves
in their world. They create a common public life which is the outcome of the activity of the
individual citizens, yet is objective and substantial—it is a force that develops, sustains, and
4

morally empowers its citizens.

This common public life rst appears in history in the Greek polis. The polis is the
construction of its citizens. It exists through their work, recognition, and sacri ce. It establishes
a common life that is objectively rooted in social and public institutions; public values, traditions,

3

Phenomenology of Spirit (hereafter PhS ), trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1977), 214 and, for the German, Gesammelte Werke (hereafter GW ), ed. Rheinisch-Westfälischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968 .), IX, 195.
4

PhS, 211-13 and GW, IX, 193-94.
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and laws; a whole philosophy, religion, and art. Citizens are willing to serve and to sacri ce for
this objective reality, a reality which then motivates them, becomes their mission and purpose,
and forms and empowers them as a people. Moreover, this objective sociocultural world is not
other, alien, or heteronomous. The citizens are not unfree. They see themselves in a world they
have constructed; they nd this world to be their own; and they are at one with it. They nd
reason in their world and are free.
Sittlichkeit is di erent from Moralität. Moralität begins with Socrates and reaches its high
point in Kant. Moralität is individual, rational, and re ective morality. It is based upon
individual autonomy and personal conviction. One must rationally decide what is moral and do
it because it is moral—because our rationality tells us that it is the right thing to do. This
rational and re ective component is relatively absent in traditional Sittlichkeit, which is best
represented, for Hegel, in the Greek polis before the rise of Socratic Moralität. Sittlichkeit is
ethical behavior grounded in custom and tradition and developed through habit and imitation in
accordance with the laws and practices of the community. Personal re ection and analysis have
little to do with traditional Sittlichkeit. Sittlichkeit is ethical life built into one's character,
attitudes, and feelings.
Furthermore, Moralität involves an ought. It is morality that ought to be realized. This
ought is also absent from Sittlichkeit. For it, morality is not something we merely ought to
realize or ought to be. Morality exists—it is. It is already embedded in our customs, traditions,
practices, character, attitudes, and feelings. The objective ethical order already exists in, is
continuously practiced by, is actualized in, the citizen.

Hegel’s Critique of Kantian Practical Reason

The only sort of morality that Hegel discusses and critiques in the remainder of Chapter V is
Moralität —individual, rational, re ective morality with individual subjectivity as the source of
moral determination. In Chapter VI, culture will involve Sittlichkeit— ethical life, morality built
upon custom, tradition, and habit—the morality of a people with moral content given in their
traditions, institutions, and practices, not the abstract and formal Moralität of Kant.
In one sense Sittlichkeit is superior to Moralität. It has a rich content—it is objective,
public, and lived. Whereas Moralität is formal and abstract. But in another sense traditional
Sittlichkeit is inferior to Moralität. Traditional Sittlichkeit's laws are immediate; they are given
as absolutes by tradition, the gods, custom. In contrast to Moralität, the role of subjectivity and
re ection is minimal and individual freedom is undeveloped.
What Hegel wants for the modern world is neither traditional Sittlichkeit nor modern
Moralität. He wants a synthesis of Sittlichkeit and Moralität, which though at times confusing
he also calls Sittlichkeit. This higher Sittlichkeit, which Hegel lays out in detail only in the
Philosophy of Right, combines the rational and re ective side of Moralität with the
transcendence of the ought characteristic of Sittlichkeit. It is rational re ective morality that
actually exists as concretely embedded in the customs, traditions, laws, character, practices, and
5

feelings of a people.

I hope to show that Hegel's entire treatment of practical reason in Chapter V of the
Phenomenology is intended as a critique of Kantian Moralität. To my knowledge this has not
been recognized by other commentators. The aim of this critique is to drive us toward
Sittlichkeit. Let me try to make the case.

5

PhS, 216 and GW, IX, 197.
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II
The rst consciousness we meet, in the section entitled "Pleasure and Necessity," is a hedonistic
consciousness. It pursues pleasure. "It plunges … into life and indulges to the full.… It does not
so much make its own happiness as straightway take it and enjoy it.… It takes hold of life much
6

as a ripe fruit is plucked, which readily o ers itself to the hand that takes it." What, one might
ask, has this to do with Kantian ethics? Hegel will not accept the Kantian distinction between
7

phenomena and noumena nor the existence of an unknown thing-in-itself. It follows from this,
then, that we are not going to be easily able to maintain a neat Kantian distinction between a pure
autonomous reason, on the one hand, and, on the other, pathological inclinations, interests, or
desires. Hegel starts with pleasure because he is not about to let Kant banish it from the pure
8

realm of reason and morality into some pathological and heteronomous outside.

It cannot be denied that Kant at times does present a rather crude picture of duty and
inclination as if they were necessarily opposed and such that moral action must be done, as he

6

PhS, 218 and GW, IX, 199.
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The Logic of Hegel (hereafter L ), trans. W. Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

1968), 91-92 and, for the German, Sämtliche Werke (hereafter SW ), ed. H. Glockner (Stuttgart:
Frommann, 1927 .), VIII, 133. PhS, 103 and GW, IX, 102.
8

Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (hereafter F ), trans. L.W. Beck (Indianapolis:

Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), 59-60 and, for the German, Kant's gesammelte Schriften (hereafter KGS ),
ed. Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1910 .), IV,
440-41.
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says in the Foundations, "only from duty and without any inclination … " But it is not only
such views that Hegel is attacking. Hegel is well aware that Kant’s considered view is not that
duty and inclination are mutually exclusive and need be opposed. He is quite well aware that for
Kant the perfect agreement of duty and inclination is an “ideal of holiness … which we should
strive to approach … in an uninterrupted in nite progress” and that such holiness is even “the
10

supreme condition of the highest good.”

Indeed, Hegel will discuss this very ideal at length not

only in “The Moral View of the World” at the end of Chapter VI, but as I shall argue shortly also
in the section that immediately follows ”Pleasure and Necessity,” namely, in “The Law of the
Heart.” At any rate, Hegel does not nd acceptable even Kant’s considered view. Kant’s
considered view is that a moral act need not be free of inclination—perhaps it is even the case
that it can never be—but still it must not be determined by inclination. Even when duty and
11

inclination accord, the act must be done from duty, not from inclination.

In Hegel’s view, Kant

9

F, 14, also 46 and KGS, IV, 398, 428.
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Critique of Practical Reason (hereafter CPrR ), trans. L.W. Beck (Indianapolis:

Bobbs-Merrill, 1956), 86, 126 and KGS, V, 83-84, 122.
11

CPrR, 86 and KGS, V, 83-84. Metaphysical Principles of Virtue: Part II of the

Metaphysics of Morals (hereafter MPV ), trans. J. Ellington (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), 12
and KGS, VI, 213-14. Also, see H.E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1990), 39-40, 97, 102, 110-11. Also, A.W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 146-48. K.R. Westphal, “Hegel’s Critique of
Kant’s Moral View of the World,” Philosophical Topics, 19 (1991), 150. B. Herman, The Practice
of Moral Judgment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 12.
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does not give enough place to inclination. A general theme of the whole remainder of Chapter V,
I shall argue, is that inclination, interest, love, or desire are far more able to produce morality, and
that Kantian practical reason is far less able to produce morality, than Kant thinks is the case.
Thus, it seems to me that Lauer radically misunderstands “Pleasure and Necessity” in taking
12

it to be a traditional attack on pleasure as self-defeating.

It is not that at all, but the very

opposite—a defense. Hegel alludes to the Faust story and claims that the pleasure-seeking of this
13

consciousness does not want to destroy the other, but only its otherness.

In other words, Hegel

is talking about love. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel says,

Love means in general terms the consciousness of my unity with another, so that I am not
in sel sh isolation but win my self-consciousness only as the renunciation of my
independence and through knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and of the
other with me.… The rst moment in love is that I do not wish to be a self-subsistent and
independent person and that, if I were, then I would feel defective and incomplete. The
second moment is that I nd myself in another person, that I count for something in the
other, while the other in turn comes to count for something in me.… love is unity of an
14

ethical type.

12

Lauer, 157.
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PhS, 218 and GW, IX, 199.
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Hegel's Philosophy of Right (hereafter PR ), trans. T.M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press,

1967), 261-62 and SW, VII, 237-38.
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In "Pleasure and Necessity," Hegel contrasts the ethical unity involved in love to whatever it is
that makes individuals separate. In a very obscure passage, he says, "But here this element
which gives to both a separate actuality is rather the category, a being which is essentially in the
form of thought. It is therefore the consciousness of independence—let it be natural
consciousness, or consciousness developed into a system of laws—which preserves the
15

individuals each for himself."

If this passage is not intended to refer explicitly to the Kantian

categorical imperative, it is at least the case that the categorical imperative is one example of
what Hegel is talking about. Kantian practical reason certainly grounds the separateness and
independence of the individual. It roots the individual in a transcendental sphere apart and
makes the individual the source of all law—even a system of laws. Each individual is taken to be
a supreme lawgiver out of which can arise a kingdom of ends. Kant says,

By a “kingdom” I understand the union of di erent rational beings in a system by common
laws. Now since it is by laws that ends are determined as regards their universal validity,
hence, if we abstract from the personal di erences of rational beings, and likewise from all
the content of their private ends, we shall be able to conceive all ends combined in a
systematic whole …

16
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PhS, 218 (italics in text) and GW, IX, 199.
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Here I prefer the Abbott translation, see Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of

Morals, trans. T.K. Abbott (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1949), 50 and KGS, IV, 433; for the Beck
translation, see F, 51.
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For Kant, to achieve the universal, to produce a kingdom of ends, to live in ethical unity with
others under a system of laws, we must abstract from the personal interests and private ends of
human beings; we must withdraw into the individuality and apartness of practical reason. Are
we really going to nd unity with others in this way? We would seem to be moving away from
unity toward the separate, individual, and isolated.
Hegel is suggesting that Kantian practical reason is less likely to be successful in producing
the ethical union it seeks and more likely to produce separateness and isolation than is love,
which indeed has already achieved, Hegel says, the "unity of itself and the other
self-consciousness"—it has already achieved the universal.

17

Love's unity with the other

self-consciousness is certainly a movement away from individual isolation toward the universal,
and if love expands, pushes toward an even larger unity with others in a kingdom of ends (as we
shall see that it does in "The Law of the Heart"), it will move further toward the universal. What
Hegel is trying to suggest here is that there is good reason to think that love might tend more
e ectively toward unity, the overcoming of separateness, the universal, the moral, than does
Kantian practical reason.
When Kant discusses love in the Foundations, the Critique of Practical Reason, and the
Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, he insists that love as an inclination cannot be commanded as
a duty. We cannot have a duty to do something gladly. Thus, for example, when Scripture

17
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commands us to love our neighbor or our enemy, in Kant’s view it cannot mean to command love
18

as an inclination, but simply bene cence from duty—not pathological love, but practical love.
It is quite clear to any sensible reader, however, that the ideal of the Gospels is not

bene cence from duty, but precisely love as an inclination. In the Spirit of Christianity, Hegel
19

attacks Kant’s distortion of the Gospels and his reduction of love to moral duty.

In love, for

Hegel, all thought of duty vanishes. Love is higher than law and makes obedience to law
super uous. Inclination is uni ed with the law and love ful lls the law in such a way that law is
20

annulled as law. Love transcends all cleavage between duty and inclination.

Hegel goes on to argue that love so transcends the law that the Gospels even suggest that we
do not want to be conscious of any action as a duty because that would mean the "intrusion of
21

something alien, resulting in the impurity of the action … "
22

that introduces impurity.

It is not, as for Kant, inclination

Duty introduces the impurity. A charitable action done out of love

could be spoiled if one started to think of it as a duty. But Hegel goes even further than this.

18

F, 15-16 and KGS, IV, 399. CPrR, 86 and KGS, V, 83. MPV, 60-61, 70, 113-14 and

KGS, VI, 401-2, 410, 449-50. Indeed, Kant even counsels “moral apathy,” a lack of emotion, which,
however, is to be distinguished from indi erence; MPV, 68 and KGS, VI, 408.
19

Spirit of Christianity and Its Fate, in On Christianity: Early Theological Writings, trans.

T.M. Knox (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1970), 205-24 and, for the German, Hegels theologische
Jugendschriften (hereafter HTJ ), ed. H. Nohl (Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1966), 261-75.
20

Spirit of Christianity, 212-14 and HTJ, 266-68.
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Spirit of Christianity, 219, also see 220 and HTJ, 272, 273.
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MPV, 12 and KGS, VI, 213.
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Since duty and inclination have been uni ed and all opposition overcome, he says, the law can
23

"be taken up (aufgenommen ) into love."

Very interestingly, this can be seen as exactly the

reverse of what Allison calls Kant’s incorporation thesis. In Religion Within the Limits of Reason
Alone, Kant writes,

freedom of the will (Willkür ) is of a wholly unique nature in that an incentive can
determine the will (Willkür ) to an action only so far as the individual has incorporated
(aufgenommen ) it into his maxim (has made it the general rule in accordance with which
he will conduct himself); only thus can an incentive, whatever it may be, co-exist with the
absolute spontaneity of the will (Willkür ) (i.e., freedom).

24

Thus, for Kant, love may determine our will in a moral act, but only insofar as it is
incorporated into a maxim, that is, only insofar as it becomes bene cence from duty or practical
love. Whereas Hegel’s view seems to be that in the ideal case duty could determine our will but
only insofar as it had been taken up into love.
I nd Hegel’s view much more acceptable than Kant’s, but, whatever one decides on this
issue, it is quite clear that Hegel is not, as Ameriks and Allison seem to suggest he is, merely

23

24

Spirit of Christianity, 225 and HTJ, 277.
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone (hereafter RWLRA ), trans. T.M. Greene and

H.H. Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), 19 (last italics in the text) and, for the German,
KGS, VI, 23-24. Allison 39-40.
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attacking a crudely understood notion of the opposition of duty to inclination.

Hegel is taking

on Kant’s subtlest and most considered views and attempting to show that, even so, duty involves
an abstract and alien distance that falls short of the ethical union achievable by love.
Nevertheless, I de nitely do not want to suggest that in the Phenomenology Hegel is simply
holding, as he may have been at moments in the Spirit of Christianity, that love is moral and that
Kantian practical reason is not. Hegel goes on to recognize (again with Faust, Faust's love for
Gretchen, and her death in mind) that the life of pleasure is a life of necessity, fate, destiny—even
of death and destruction. Here Hegel might seem to have fallen back into the crude view that
inclination and desire are simply opposed to the moral—and are heteronomous, determined, part
of a realm of causal necessity, and so forth.
But Hegel is much more careful than this. We must attend more closely to the way in which
he understands fate. He says, "necessity, fate, and the like, is just that about which we cannot say
what it does, what its speci c laws and positive content are, because it is … a relation that is
simple and empty, but also irresistible and imperturbable, whose work is merely the nothingness
26

of individuality."

Fate is not to be identi ed with ordinary causal determinism. Fate is more

like chance. It is certainly nothing that a scientist can predict ahead of time—because we cannot
say what the laws are. Yet a life at the mercy of chance can certainly be experienced as a cruel
fate. Chance is not at all like the regular and predictable causal determinism to be expected in

25

K. Ameriks, “The Hegelian Critique of Kantian Morality,” in New Essays on Kant, ed. B.

den Ouden and M. Moen (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), 194-97. Allison, 184-85.
26
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the Kantian realm of phenomenal appearance, yet, Hegel is suggesting, the total absence of
predictability and control is just as much, or more, a necessity, a fate, a heteronomy.
If this is conceded, then it will be very interesting to notice that while Kant usually holds that
freedom has its own laws, at least in some places he explains freedom as independence from the
27

laws of nature, liberation from all compulsion, the absence of all rules.

For Hegel, I suggest,

freedom as absence of law (perhaps even—Hegel will suggest as we proceed— freedom that is
unable to give us its laws) can be seen as fate. We cannot say what it does—it is blind,
imperturbable, and irresistible. To be cut o from the world is very likely to end up at the mercy
of the world. In Hegel's view, to the extent that the Kantian transcendental self is separate from
the concrete causal world, to the extent that it is cut o from the empirical, it risks subjecting
itself to the mercy of fate—or at least seriously contributes to this. Fate occurs because we turn
away from the world, leave it to itself, to chance, and thus end up at the mercy of chance, which
appears as an uncontrollable necessity. If this is so, it spells disaster for Kant. Fate, though it
arises from freedom, subverts freedom. If you are subject to fate you are not self-determined. If
the self has a destiny, if it is at the mercy of fate, if it is the plaything of chance, the self becomes
alien to itself. Heteronomy would emerge within the autonomous self.
Fate can be compared to history. History is very central to Hegel's concept of Sittlichkeit.
The sociocultural realm is the historical product of human activity, a product that in turn
transforms and develops human beings themselves, a realm which they can come to understand

27

Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter CPR ), A447=B475; I have used the N. Kemp Smith

translation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965) and KGS, III-IV, but cite the standard A and B
edition pagination so that any edition may be used. Allison, 20. Also CPrR, 100 and KGS, V, 97.
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and in which they can come to be at home and thus free. Sittlichkeit is rst beginning to emerge
here in Chapter V of the Phenomenology, and fate is the rst, simplest, thinnest view of history.
We have nothing but purely individual consciousnesses, their drives, passions, desires, and the
clashes between them—all understood as something completely uncontrolled, ununderstood,
mere chaos, mere chance. Such a view of history emerges because we view the world only from
the inadequate perspective of individual consciousness and are unable to see how consciousness
can understand let alone produce or control its historical world—it merely su ers it. Two
sections further on in the Phenomenology, in "Virtue and the Way of the World," we will already
have moved, I shall argue, to a more complex view of history, the view Kant spells out in his
"Idea for a Universal History," where fate will turn into providence. In other words, history will
appear rationally directed. To speak of fate is to say there is no rationality—no order, direction,
or control—involved.

III
In the next section of Chapter V, "The Law of the Heart and the Frenzy of Self-Conceit," we
move from Goethe's Faust to his Werther, and we get a more complicated moral consciousness
that still seeks pleasure, but not merely its own. Its pleasure is to bring pleasure to all hearts. As
in "Pleasure and Necessity," love rather e ectively tends toward the universal and it is also the
case that it is inclined to do so. The Law of the Heart, then, seeks to promote the welfare of all
28

humanity as a universal end and it takes pleasure in doing so. There is a lawlike attitude here.

This consciousness acts upon a Kantian categorical imperative. Or, as Hegel puts it, this heart

28

PhS, 221-22 and GW, IX, 202-3.
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“has within it a law … “

In other words, it takes up or incorporates the law: what this heart

“realizes is itself the law, and its pleasure is therefore at the same time the universal pleasure of
all hearts. To it the two are undivided; its pleasure is what conforms to the law, and the
30

realization of the law of universal humanity procures for it its own particular pleasure.”
Compare this to Kant, who in the Foundations says,

To be bene cent when we can is a duty; and besides this, there are many minds so
sympathetically constituted that, without any other motive of vanity or self-interest, they
nd a pleasure in spreading joy around them, and can take delight in the satisfaction of
others so far as it is their own work. But I maintain that in such a case an action of this
kind, however proper, however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth, but
is on a level with other inclinations, for example, the inclination to honor, which …
31

deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem.

Acting from inclination has no true moral worth. But, on the other hand, acting from duty
and being inclined to do so is an ideal of holiness. Kant says, “to love one’s neighbor means to
like to practice all duties toward him. The command which makes this a rule cannot require that

29

PhS, 221 and GW, IX, 202.

30

PhS, 222 and GW, IX, 203.
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we have this disposition but only that we endeavor after it.”

The perfect agreement of duty and

inclination is an

ideal of holiness … unattainable by any creature … yet an archetype which we should
strive to approach … in an uninterrupted in nite progress. If a rational creature could ever
reach the stage of thoroughly liking to do all moral laws, it would mean that there was no
possibility of there being in him a desire which could tempt him to deviate from them … To
33

such a level of moral disposition no creature can ever attain.
34

Such holiness is “the supreme condition of the highest good.”

The highest good, for Kant, sets

as its ideal a perfect agreement between the moral law and inclination— in other words, it is a
law of the heart. And since the satisfaction of our inclinations would amount to happiness, the
highest good also requires the reconciliation of virtue and happiness. If happiness did not
accompany virtue, we certainly would not have the highest good for human beings. But virtue
and happiness would seem to be irreconcilable. Happiness requires the regular satisfaction of
our inclinations, interests, and desires. But to be virtuous, we certainly cannot be determined by
inclination, interest, or desire. We must be determined by the moral law. And there is no reason
to think that virtue will produce happiness. If we lived solely in a phenomenal world, Kant
thinks, there would be no reason to expect virtue and happiness to accord. Only if there is also

32

CPrR, 86 and KGS, V, 83.

33

Ibid.

34
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an intelligible world can we imagine such reconciliation as an ideal, and only, Kant thinks, if we
postulate a God who will see to it that nature is ordered such that while we act virtuously our
desires will at the same time be satis ed so that we can also be happy, and happy in proportion to
35

our worthiness to be happy, that is, in proportion to our virtue.

What we have here then, Hegel insists, and Kant fully admits, is an ideal. Inclination ideally
36

ought to agree with the moral law—but this is not something actually achieved.

Hegel says that

the law is still separated from the heart and exists on its own such that most of humanity, while
accepting the law, will not actually nd it in unity with the heart and so will have to dispense
with actual enjoyment in obeying it. Thus the law will start to become for the heart a mere show
37

that will not seem to deserve the authority and reality it is supposed to have.

Hegel's point in all

of this, I believe, is that we have not transcended all cleavage between objective law and
subjective feeling so as to annul the law as law—we have not achieved Sittlichkeit. We merely
have a Kantian ideal of unity between law and inclination. And this ideal, Hegel wants to go on
to argue, is not likely to work in actual cases.
From the start, the law of the heart has hated and opposed any imposition from outside (by
authorities, the government, whatever) of laws that o end the heart. All law must agree with the
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heart—that is the only acceptable law. Kant would at least seem to be in agreement with this. In
Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, he claims that we have a practical knowledge that
rests “solely upon reason and … lies as close to every man, even the most simple, as though it
were engraved upon his heart—a law, which we need but name to nd ourselves at once in
agreement with everyone else regarding its authority, and which carries with it in everyone’s
38

consciousness unconditioned binding force, to wit, the law of morality.”

Where does this

law—capable of producing such complete agreement as if engraved upon our very hearts—come
from? In the Foundations, the third formulation of the categorical imperative tells us that each
rational being is a supreme legislator, “subject only to his own, yet universal, legislation, and …
only bound to act in accordance with his own will, which is, however, designed by nature to be a
39

will giving universal laws.”

Kant sees no trouble at all in claiming that we are subject to no law but our own, yet that we
can legislate for all. Lacking Sittlichkeit, Hegel thinks there will be a great deal of trouble to be
found here. In the Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, Kant does admit that there is a distinction
we must notice. In ethics the “law is conceived as the law of one’s own will and not of the will
in general, which could also be the will of others; in the latter case such a law would give rise to
40

a juridical duty … “

This seems to suggest that while a law one gives oneself can be one’s own,

others might not take it as their own. Indeed, Kant says that I can “be forced by others to
actions which are directed as means to an end, but I can never be forced by others to have an end;
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I alone can make something an end for myself.… for I can have no end except of my own
41

making.”

42

Thus, while it is my duty, for Kant, to promote the happiness of others as my end, it

does not seem that this could cause others to accept it as their end. In fact, in Religion Within the
Limits of Reason Alone, it seems to be the case that in an ethical commonwealth not only will it
be the case that others will not accept my legislation as their own but that even:

the people, as a people, cannot itself be regarded as the law-giver. For in such a
commonwealth all the laws are expressly designed to promote the morality of actions
(which is something inner, and hence cannot be subject to public human laws), whereas, in
contrast, these public laws—and this would go to constitute a juridical commonwealth—are
directed only toward the legality of actions, which meets the eye, and not towards (inner)
morality …

43

However, it would seem that Kant wants it both ways. The state cannot force disposition to
virtue, yet it seems to count on it,

it would be a contradiction … for the political commonwealth to compel its citizens to
enter into an ethical commonwealth, since the very concept of the latter involves freedom
from coercion. Every political commonwealth may indeed wish to be possessed of a
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sovereignty, according to laws of virtue, over the spirits [of its citizens]; for then, when its
methods of compulsion do not avail … their dispositions to virtue would bring about what
was required. But woe to the legislator who wishes to establish through force a polity
directed to ethical ends! For in so doing he would not merely achieve the very opposite of
44

an ethical polity but also undermine his political state and make it insecure.

The legislator wants everyone to take the legislator’s law as their own, be disposed toward it,
take it as a law of their heart, but woe to the legislator who tries to legislate such a law of the
heart. We are certainly not very far along here toward the ideal of agreement between duty and
inclination, virtue and happiness, the law and the heart. And so, as Hegel puts it, what will
happen is that others will not nd the law to be “the ful llment of the law of their hearts, but
rather that of someone else; and, precisely in accordance with the universal law that each shall
nd in what is law his own heart, they turn against the reality he set up, just as he turned against
theirs. Thus, just as the individual at rst nds only the rigid law, now he nds the hearts of men
45

themselves, opposed to his excellent intentions and detestable.”

Others cannot recognize

themselves in the law of my heart. If my legislation were to stand as a universal ordinance,
others would nd it merely my imposition and would turn against it as the very law of the heart
46

demands.
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What Hegel is suggesting here, and it is something he will further develop in the section
entitled "The Spiritual Animal Kingdom," is that Kant was quite correct in the view that the law
must come from your own reason— though Kant was not fully aware of what this actually
implied. It is not enough that laws just be rational. They must be your own. Human beings are
very much motivated by what is their own—their desire to express themselves and recognize
their own doing in the result. And if forced to chose between what is rational or universal and
what is their own they will nd such a situation oppressive. Lauer argues that the trouble with
47

the law of the heart is that it does not act on the categorical imperative.

That is seriously

mistaken. The law of the heart does involve a categorical imperative and that is precisely what
is wrong with it. Hegel is attacking the categorical imperative.
But the worst is yet to come. Hegel thinks that Kantian morality will always result in an alien
situation, one that always establishes a law that is not your own—even if you yourself instituted
the law. In the Spirit of Christianity, Hegel said, the "consciousness of having performed his
duty enables the individual to claim universality for himself; he intuits himself as universal, as
raised above himself qua particular and above the whole sphere of particularity, i.e., above the
mass of individuals.… and this self-consciousness of his is as foreign to the action as men’s
48

applause.”

In the “Law of the Heart,” Hegel says that in carrying out

the law of his heart.… the law has in fact escaped the individual; it directly becomes merely
the relation which was supposed to be got rid of. The law of the heart, through its very
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realization, ceases to be a law of the heart. For in its realization it … is now a universal
power for which this particular heart is a matter of indi erence, so that the individual, by
setting up his own ordinance, no longer nds it to be his own. Consequently, what the
individual brings into being through the realization of his law, is not his law … but actually
is for him an alien a air … a superior power which is [not] only alien to him, but one
49

which is hostile.

After all, if the legislation of public law, as we have seen Kant himself say in Religion Within the
Limits of Reason Alone, cannot be taken to demand anything inner, if the legislator cannot
expect to legislate disposition to virtue (without undermining the political state and making it
insecure), then what di erence does it make who the legislator is—you yourself or someone
else? As soon as a public law is established that must keep its distance in this way from the
inner, from disposition, from your own, from the heart, such a law (Hegel is perfectly correct in
claiming) will escape the individual and become an alien power—even for the very individual
who established the law.
The problem here is that we do not have Sittlichkeit. We have instead a modern separation of
universal law and the heart—a separation perfectly expressed in Kantian ethics. Moreover,
Kantian ethics simply would not accept Sittlichkeit. The Kantian individual would certainly nd
the "divine and human ordinance[s]" of the ancient world, which were taken "as an accepted
authority", to be instead, as Hegel puts it, "a dead authority in which not only its own self … but
also those subject to that ordinance would have no consciousness of themselves … " In short,
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Kantian ethics would nd the objective laws of the ancient world to be an alien authority—it
would nd them to be heteronomous. It would see nothing of itself, its own, in those laws.
Custom and tradition, laws based on religion or mythology, for Kant, could not be forms of
rational autonomy. They would be other, heteronomous, alien. What this completely misses, in
Hegel’s view, is that ancient law was "really animated by the consciousness of all", it was in fact
"the law of every heart.… for this means nothing else than that individuality becomes an object
50

to itself in the form of universality in which, however, it does not recognize itself."

The divine

and human laws of the ancient world, for Hegel, were constituted by the cultural and historical
action of the citizens themselves and embedded in their customs, traditions, practices, and
feelings—they were their own laws. They had an objective and universal form such that
citizens did not see that they had constituted them, but they were the law of every heart. The
universal and feelings were not separate here. Their unity was not a mere ideal; their unity was
51

actual.

As Hegel put it in an earlier text,

As free men the Greeks and Romans obeyed laws laid down by themselves, obeyed men
whom they had themselves appointed to o ce, waged wars on which they had themselves
decided, gave their property, exhausted their passions, and sacri ced their lives by
thousands for an end which was their own. They neither learned nor taught [a moral
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system] but evinced by their actions the moral maxims which they could call their very
own. In public as in private and domestic life, every individual was a free man, one who
lived by his own laws. The idea (Idee ) of his country or of his state was the invisible and
higher reality for which he strove, which impelled him to e ort; it was the nal end of his
world or in his eyes the nal end of the world, an end which he found manifested in the
realities of daily life or which he himself co-operated in manifesting and maintaining.
Confronted by this idea, his own individuality vanished; it was only this idea’s
maintenance, life and persistence he asked for, and these were things which he himself
52

could make realities.

The cultural and historical construction of institutions and laws will be traced at length in
Chapter VI of the Phenomenology— from the ancient world through the French Revolution. And
in Chapter VI, the further we move into the modern and Kantian world, the more it will be the
case that our laws are not seen as our own. In the ancient world, laws were our own—they were
laws of the heart.
The failure of the law of the heart in the modern world leads to the frenzy of self-conceit.
You blame the domination that arises from the law of the heart not on yourself—your heart is
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pure, all you want is the happiness of others. The fact that they do not accept this, the fact that
53

they see it as domination, is not due to you; it is a general perversion of the law of the heart:

The consciousness which sets up the law of its heart therefore meets with resistance from
others, because it contradicts the equally individual laws of their hearts; and these others in
their resistance are doing nothing else but setting up and claiming validity for their own
law. The universal that we have here is, then, only a universal resistance and struggle of all
against one another, in which each claims validity for his own individuality, but at the same
time does not succeed in his e orts, because each meets with the same resistance from the
others, and is nulli ed by their reciprocal resistance. What seems to be public order, then,
is this universal state of war, in which each wrests what he can for himself, executes justice
on the individuality of others and establishes his own, which is equally nulli ed through the
action of the others. It is the 'way of the world', the show of an unchanging course that is
only meant to be a universality …

54

The "Way of the World" or the "Course of the World"—in German, "der Weltlauf"— is a term
55

that Hegel nds in Kant.

Certainly, Hegel's description of the "Way of the World" is intended
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to refer to an arrangement central to Kant's political philosophy and philosophy of history.
Compare the above passage from Hegel to the following passage from Kant's Perpetual Peace,

many say a republic would have to be a nation of angels, because men with their sel sh
inclinations are not capable of a constitution of such sublime form. But precisely with
these inclinations nature comes to the aid of the general will established on reason, which is
revered even though impotent in practice. Thus it is only a question of a good organization
of the state (which does lie in man's power), whereby the powers of each sel sh inclination
are so arranged in opposition that one moderates or destroys the ruinous e ect of the other.
The consequence for reason is the same as if none of them existed, and man is forced to be
a good citizen even if not a morally good person.
The problem of organizing a state, however hard it may seem, can be solved even for a
race of devils, if only they are intelligent. The problem is: "Given a multitude of rational
beings requiring universal laws for their preservation, but each of whom is secretly inclined
to exempt himself from them, to establish a constitution in such a way that, although their

I represent to myself (either by the light of history or by the guiding-clues of causes and e ects) that
a regressive series of possible perceptions in accordance with empirical laws, in a word, that the
course of the world [der Weltlauf ], conducts us to a past time-series as condition of the present
time—a series which, however, can be represented as actual not in itself but only in the connection of
a possible experience"; CPR, A495; also A450=B478. Also, see MPV, 15 and KGS, VI, 216. Also
see Luther’s translation of the Bible, Ephesians 2:2.
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private intentions con ict, they check each other, with the result that their public conduct is
the same as if they had no such intentions."
A problem like this must be capable of solution; it does not require that we know how to
attain the moral improvement of men but only that we should know the mechanism of
nature in order to use it on men, organizing the con ict of the hostile intentions present in a
people in such a way that they must compel themselves to submit to coercive laws. Thus a
state of peace is established in which laws have force.…

56

The assumption of the ancient world was always that in a good city the universal and the
heart (law and morality, on the one hand, and inclination, interest, custom, tradition, on the other)
would agree—Sittlichkeit was the norm. In the modern world, the assumption is the reverse, that
the universal and the heart are separate and will diverge, though the heart can be manipulated so
as to produce the universal. For Kant, the ideal of holiness is that the universal and the heart,
duty and inclination, agree. This ideal is the supreme condition of the highest good—what Hegel
calls the law of the heart. But it is only an ideal and all we end up with is the frenzy of
self-conceit, the organization of a race of devils into the appearance of a nation of angels, public
order that is really a state of war, the reciprocal nulli cation of con icting interests appearing as
the universal. At any rate, we have already arrived at the next section: "Virtue and the Way of
the World."
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IV
The law of the heart, then, dissolves merely into virtue. In other words, the consciousness now
before us no longer takes pleasure in acting on the universal; it no longer combines inclination
and the moral law. It simply does its duty. All we have is ordinary Kantian virtue, and it stands
opposed to the way of the world, the con ict of particular interests that it intends to manipulate in
order to produce virtuous results. Like Lauer and Hyppolite, many commentators seem to think
57

that "Virtue and the Way of the World" is about Don Quixote.

I think there is a passing

58

reference to Quixote in one passage, but that is not what the section is about. No commentator
that I am aware of sees what the section, at least in my opinion, is so very clearly about, namely,
Kant's philosophy of history.
In his "Idea for a Universal History," Kant tells us that there are two forces at work in history.
The rst is the con ict of particular interests; the second is morality. And both, for Kant, lead to
59

the very same end—peace, justice, and a league of nations.
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Kant thinks that we nd two propensities within human beings. He sums these up as
"unsocial sociability." Human beings have an unsocial propensity—a propensity to sel shness
and lack of concern for the interests of others. But they also have a social propensity. They must
cooperate with others in society to satisfy their needs. These two propensities
together—associating with others, yet being sel sh and unsocial—produce con ict, competition,
and even war. While there is an obvious negative side to this con ict, there is also a positive
side. Con ict and sel shness, after all, drive us to accomplish things; competition sharpens our
60

abilities. We are driven toward the development of our powers, capacities, and talents.

So, for Kant, we are driven to society by sociability and the need for others. Once in society,
competition and sel shness set in and our powers and capacities develop. This development, for
61

Kant, will eventually lead to the society of morality, justice, and peace that he is after.

The

notion that con icting self-interest leads toward what morality demands is quite similar to, and
perhaps Kant even gets it from, Adam Smith. In a market economy, each pursues their own
self-interest. Nevertheless, for Smith, this self-seeking not only produces a common good, it
does so more e ectively than if individuals had consciously and cooperatively sought the
common good. Aggressive self-seeking, given the interdependence of each upon all, produces a
national capital, the wealth of the nation, that common good, out of which each struggles to gain
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their particular share. Self-seeking produces this common good through an "invisible hand"; that
62

is, behind our backs and despite our intentions.

For Kant, there is also an "unsocial sociability" at the international level. We nd the
assertion of national self-interest that drives nations toward aggression and war. Yet there is also
an important form of sociability among nations, namely, their interest in commerce and trade. It
is the dynamic interplay between these factors that will lead to a league of nations, peace, and
international law.
As wars become more serious, destructive, and expensive, they become more uncertain.
They come into con ict with ever-increasing economic interests—they interfere with trade. As
world trade grows, as nations become more interdependent, war poses an ever-greater threat to
the smooth functioning of the international market. At the rst sign of war, other nations will
intervene to arbitrate, to quash the war, in order to secure their own national commercial
63

interests. This is the rst step toward a league of nations.

The second force at work in history is morality. We can easily see that morality, the
categorical imperative, would demand fair laws, just constitutions, and an end to wars. We could
not will to universalize war, unjust constitutions, and unfair laws. Morality would also demand a
64

league of nations.

And morality, for Kant, is one of the forces at work in history. Moreover, the

other force, we have already seen, drives us toward the very same point that morality does. War
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among nations and commercial interest drive us toward peace, law, and a league of nations. Both
65

morality and war converge toward the same end.

In the long passage quoted above from Perpetual Peace, we see a good example of these two
forces at work. Kant argues that sel sh inclinations must be arranged so that they cancel each
other out and thus devils can end up with a society that might have seemed possible only for
those with the morality of angels. Both forces are necessary for Kant. One without the other is
not enough. Reason and morality alone, he says, would never achieve our end. Humans are too
66

corrupt.

On the other hand, con ict or war alone will never actually make us moral. Con ict

and war drive us toward peace and legality. But this is only to say that our self-interest drives us
toward peace and law; and self-interest is not moral for Kant.
If, for Kant, we are able to form an idea for a universal history; if we can see that in history
the dynamic tension between war and commerce will lead us unconsciously toward the same
point that reason and morality would consciously lead us; then Kant thinks that the second force
at work in history, our own reason, our own morality, can begin to guide this historical
67

development toward its goal.

68

History can be rationally guided. We can have providence, not

just fate.
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Hegel clearly has Kantian morality and philosophy of history in mind as he plays out the
interaction between the two consciousnesses that stand before us: virtue and the way of the
69

world.

Virtue, he says, is the consciousness that universal law is essential and that

individuality—which is to say, inclination and particular interest—must be sacri ced to the
universal and thus brought under its discipline and control. Virtue wills to accomplish a good
that is not yet actual; it is an ought that must be realized. And it can be realized only through
70

virtue's nullifying of individuality.

In the Metaphysical Principles of Virtue, Kant says that the

“moral capacity of man would not be virtue if it were not actualized by the strength of one’s
resolution in con ict with powerful opposing inclinations. Virtue is the product of pure practical
reason insofar as the latter, in the consciousness of its superiority (through freedom), gains
71

mastery over the inclinations.”

He also says you must “dare to do battle against all the forces of

nature within you and round about you, and to conquer them when they come into con ict with
72

your moral principles.”

For the way of the world, on the other hand, individuality takes itself to be essential—which
is to say that it pursues self-interest. It seeks its own inclinations, pleasures, and enjoyment, and
in doing so it subordinates the universal to itself. For Kant, as we saw, both morality and the
con ict of particular interests converge toward the same universal end. So also, Hegel says, the
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way of the world, through the con ict of particular interests, achieves the universal—the very
73

same universal that virtue seeks.

For Kant, it was morality's task to guide the historical con ict

of particular interests and to hasten it toward its end. For Hegel too, virtue attempts to assist the
way of the world to realize the universal.
At this point, however, Hegel's disagreement with Kant begins to sharpen. Hegel argues that,
in fact, virtue's assistance is unnecessary; the way of the world is quite capable of realizing the
74

universal on its own. The Quixotic assistance of the knight of virtue is a sham.

Virtue wants to

bring the good into existence by the sacri ce of individuality or particular interest. But it is
individuality, the con ict of particular interests, that actually realizes the universal. Virtue denies
the accomplishments of the way of the world and attempts to claim them for itself. Virtue always
wants to treat the universal as something that does not yet exist, something that ought to be,
something it will bring about, rather than as something which already is. Sittlichkeit is emerging
here. Hegel says:

Virtue in the ancient world had its own de nite sure meaning, for it had in the spiritual
substance of the nation a foundation full of meaning, and for its purpose an actual good
already in existence. Consequently, too, it was not directed against the actual world as
against something generally perverted, and against a 'way of the world'. But the virtue we
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are considering has its being outside of the spiritual substance, it is an unreal virtue, a
75

virtue in imagination and name only, which lacks that substantial content.

For Hegel, we must drop the idea that virtue exists only as a principle, an ought, which as yet
has no actual existence and which must be brought into existence through the sacri ce of
individuality, particular interest, or passion. Hegel's objection to Kantian morality is that it is
abstract, outside the world, an ought, and that it believes that only it is capable of realizing the
76

universal.

It has severed itself from the concrete actual world of interest and passion, and faces

it as an other. From this superior position it wants to direct the world. Instead, morality must be
rooted in the world.
Or, to put this another way, Kant's philosophy of history and his ethics are written from the
perspective of individual consciousness—the perspective that there are only individual
consciousnesses. Morality, for Kant, is a matter of individual will abstracted from the concrete
actual world. Certainly, for Kant, inclinations, interests, and passions are part of the world and
are to be carefully distinguished from the individual moral will if the individual is to be
self-determined and thus free. It is this separation that Hegel objects to. It involves the “creation
77

of distinctions that are no distinctions … “

Kant has no notion of Sittlichkeit, which Hegel is

trying to push us towards here. Sittlichkeit is morality embedded in a concrete cultural world.
For Hegel, virtue and the way of the world, particular interest and the universal, morality and the
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concrete world, are not separate opposed realities externally related to each other. They are
internally related as parts of a single cultural reality that already exists; it is not something that
merely ought to be realized.
We must abandon the perspective of individual consciousness and adopt a perspective in
which the concrete world and individual consciousness are seen as two parts of one spiritual
unity. Individual consciousness is the internalization of the sociocultural world and the
sociocultural world is the outcome and expression of the actions of individual consciousnesses.
Each develops in interaction with the other, and each transforms the other.
Hegel agrees with the Kantian and Smithian notion that a con ict of particular interests leads
to the universal. What Hegel does not accept is that this can be adequately understood at the
level of individual consciousness. For it to be correctly understood, we must move to the level of
culture. Culture explains how individual interest—the concrete way of the world—is connected
to virtue. The interaction among particular interests gives rise to a set of institutions, a world,
which develops a spiritual life of its own and which reacts back upon and molds those individual
consciousnesses and leads them to virtue. Particular interest and virtue are not two externally
related realms eternally distinguished from each other. They are internally related as two
interacting parts within a single cultural unity. Each produces and molds the other. Virtue is
simply mistaken in thinking itself independent and outside this spiritual reality, superior to it, and
thus able to manipulate and guide particular interests from above. Particular interests as they are
formed by their cultural world actually take an interest in virtue and virtue is something that
properly engages and develops out of our passions, inclinations, and interests. Moreover, there is
no ought that is above, outside, independent and that the individual will must set out to realize.

Hegel’s Critique of Kantian Practical Reason

Morality already exists as the spiritual unity that encloses us, that is our very being, and that is
embedded in our feelings, desires, and interests. Hegel's task is to reconcile us to what is by
allowing us to correctly understand what is. His aim is not to transform reality in accordance
with an abstract and independent ought. Virtue is not something as yet nonexistent that we ought
to realize; it is something already existing that we must come to more deeply recognize and
rationally grasp in our actual sociocultural practices. As Hegel puts it in the Philosophy of Right,

After all, the truth about Right, Ethics, and the state is as old as its public recognition and
formulation in the law of the land, in the morality of everyday life, and in religion. What
more does this truth require—since the thinking mind is not content to possess it in this
ready fashion? It requires to be grasped in thought as well; the content which is already
rational in principle must win the form of rationality …
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At any rate, Kantian practical reason ends in failure. It thinks it can direct the course of the
world, but it turns out that this is self-delusion. The course of the world does better than does
virtue.

V
"Virtue and the Way of the World," then, achieves a universal end brought about by the action of
particular interests. What this shows us, Hegel suggests in the next section, entitled "The
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Spiritual Animal Kingdom and Deceit, or the Fact Itself," is that action can only be judged by
what it does. Only the action achieved is a reality, not the idea that is supposed to guide the
action from above or outside. We cannot determine the reality of the action until it takes
place—we cannot see the universal moral result in the particular interests until the con icting
particular interests have actually realized the universal. The reality of any potentiality, capacity,
or talent is its realization, not what we hope or desire or intend, but what becomes, what is
actually realized in action. The talent of engineers or artists is seen in the bridges they build or
the paintings they paint, not merely in their hopes, dreams, or intentions concerning possible
80

bridges or paintings.

In an earlier section, Hegel discussed physiognomy, the doctrine propounded by Lavater to
the e ect that the inner character of individuals is expressed outwardly in their bodily form and
facial expressions. If we wonder why Hegel spent so much time attacking what to most people is
obviously a pseudoscience, part of the answer is that Hegel's attack against physiognomy hits at
much more than just physiognomy—it hits at Kant's ethics as well. Physiognomy regards the
deed and its performance as inessential and irrelevant. It regards only inner intentions as
81

essential and thinks it can discern these inner truths through, say, facial expressions.

Physiognomy pushes this way too far. As Hegel puts it, "'If anyone said, "You certainly act like
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an honest man, but I see from your face that you are forcing yourself to do so and are a rogue at
heart"; without a doubt, every honest fellow to the end of time, when thus addressed, will retort
82

with a box on the ear.'"

But how far from this is Kant, who in the Foundations says, "when moral worth is in
question, it is not a matter of actions which one sees but of their inner principles which one does
83

not see."

How is it, then, that we can be sure of these inner intentions? Well, that is something

of a problem even for Kant,

if we attend to our experience of the way men act, we meet frequent and, as we ourselves
confess, justi ed complaints that we cannot cite a single sure example of the disposition to
act from pure duty.… It is in fact absolutely impossible by experience to discern with
complete certainty a single case in which the maxim of an action, however much it may
conform to duty, rested solely on moral grounds and on the conception of one's duty. It
sometimes happens that in the most searching self-examination we can nd nothing except
the moral ground of duty which could have been powerful enough to move us to this or that
good action and to such great sacri ce. But from this we cannot by any means conclude
with certainty that a secret impulse of self-love, falsely appearing as the idea of duty, was
not actually the true determining cause of the will.… our concern is not whether this or that
was done but that reason of itself and independently of all appearances commands what
ought to be done. Our concern is with actions of which perhaps the world has never had an
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example, with actions whose feasibility might be seriously doubted by those who base
84

everything on experience, and yet with actions inexorably commanded by reason.

This simply will not work. How are we to establish the existence of the sort of intelligible
self that could ground such pure intentions, unsullied by self-love, of which the world has
perhaps never seen an example, but which are inexorably commanded by reason? If we accepted
the existence of a noumenal realm that could keep reason and its pure intentions apart in a
beyond where they could be considered an inner essence behind the outer appearance of
self-love, we might begin to argue for the existence of such an intelligible self. But Hegel will
not concede the existence of such a realm and, indeed, most modern commentators nd the very
concept to be an embarrassment which they either ignore or avoid. We might instead try to argue
that without such an intelligible self and the freedom it implies, we could not understand the
85

possibility of morality.

But Hegel has just shown us that this is not so. We do not need a virtue

to direct the course of the world. The particular interests that make up the course of the world
are quite able on their own to realize the universal. Furthermore, by Kant’s own admission in the
passage just quoted, we cannot even cite a single sure example of an action done from pure duty.
How then can we claim to establish that there is or must be an intelligible self, the seat of a
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reason that of itself and independently of all appearances is able to issue inexorable commands of
pure duty?
All we have is a deed, a doing, an action. There is no self residing inside us in a beyond or in
a second world or that somehow escapes the supposed heteronomy of the phenomenal world. All
we have here, as Hegel puts it, is a distinction that is no distinction—a distinction that is purely
86

nominal.

For Hegel, there is no way to get a hold of inner intentions—certainly not if that is supposed
to allow us to measure or critique or avoid the deed. The deed is not a mere outer expression of
an inner intention. The deed is what it is: murder, theft, bravery. It is what can be said of it. We
should not fancy that we are something else than what we have done. We should not explain
away our deed by appeal to intentions—something "meant," something conjectured. What we
87

are, our essence, is the work we have done.

Let us say, then, that action is a self-expression—not of a transcendental self, but simply the
expression or realization of a capacity or talent—and that this is the way we must understand
individuality. The self or the individual is simply what is expressed, what is realized, in the
action or work. The self is not some mysterious entity behind or beyond its action. We cannot
appeal to an inner self to measure the deed. That would be to go beyond the essential nature of
the work which is simply to be the realization of a potential. It will follow from this that there is
no room even for exaltation, lamentation, or repentance over the work. Any of this would be to
presuppose a self-in-itself that was, or might have been, or that failed to be, realized. But there is
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no such self-in-itself. The original nature or potential of the individual can be nothing but what
actually gets carried out, expressed, realized in the world. We cannot lament that our work does
not live up to our potential. Our potential is nothing but what we are able to realize in our work.
The individual is what the individual actually does, not what they merely hope, dream, or intend.
88

This is a view that academics are not likely to nd congenial. We are all deeply convinced

that we are capable of far more and much greater work than we ever turn out. Such is our
self-delusion. There is no room for a Kantian self-in-itself behind or beyond or distinguished
from what is actually realized.
In one of the examples that Kant gives of a moral act in the Foundations, he discusses
talents. Hegel, I suggest, is arguing that Kant's treatment of talents is seriously awed. Kant
asks if the moral law could allow us to will to leave a useful talent undeveloped, and concludes
that it will not allow us to do so. We cannot universalize not developing such a talent. The
89

categorical imperative demands that we develop such talents.

In the Metaphysical Principles of

Virtue, Kant says that we have a duty to cultivate our natural powers, capacities, and
90

endowments.

The moral law, then, commands us to take as our end the realization of such speci c talents.
For Hegel this is simply incoherent. It is impossible to determine what this end might be before
it has actually been realized. What talent I might have, what my potential might be, can only be
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discovered in what I am nally able to make real through action. Do I have the potential to write
a book that is truly a masterpiece and thus would have a moral obligation to keep at it until I
actually produce that book? Or do I merely have the potential to write a few valuable and
interesting things and when I have done so would best be advised to move on to another topic?
Or is it the case that my talent really lies in a completely di erent eld altogether and that I am
wasting my time in writing. You cannot know what your end is, what your talent is, what
potential you have until you have actually carried it out.
Bernard Williams tells a story of a Gauguin-like gure who while concerned with the de nite
and pressing human claims made upon him and what is involved in their being neglected
nevertheless turns away from them in order to realize his gifts as a painter and to pursue his art.
This involves a good deal of risk. Whether or not he succeeds in developing this gift, whether he
actually has a signi cant gift, he cannot tell for sure ahead of time. Thus, whether his action can
be justi ed depends, certainly in part, on whether he actually has and is nally able to develop
91

this gift. Any justi cation, then, will at least in part have to be retrospective.

But for Kant the

categorical imperative would certainly seem to require that we know and will our end ahead of
time. We must act on a maxim—a maxim that we formulate, analyze, and nd to be
universalizable ahead of time. If we do not have such a rational principle to act upon, our act
will be heteronomous, at the whim of the way of the world—not free or moral. However, Allison
argues that:
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since maxims are self-imposed rules, one cannot make something one’s maxim without in
some sense being aware of it as such, or at least without the capacity to become aware of
it.… This does not entail, however, either that we possess a “Cartesian certainty” regarding
our motivation (which Kant, of course, denies) or that we must explicitly formulate our
maxims to ourselves before acting. The point is rather a conceptual one: namely, that I
cannot act on a principle (according to the conception of law) without an awareness of that
principle, although I need not be explicitly aware of myself as acting on that principle.
Moreover, it must be possible in subsequent re ection to discover and articulate (albeit not
in an indefeasible way) the maxims on which one acts …
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But where we cannot know ahead of time what our potential, our talent, and thus our end is,
it does not make sense to say that in subsequent re ection we could discover and articulate the
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maxim on which we acted. If it was not possible to formulate a speci c maxim in the rst place,
it would not be possible to discover and articulate one in retrospect. Instead of speci c maxims,
Kant seems to have in mind all-purpose maxims to the e ect that we should realize whatever
useful talents we might have,

No principle of reason prescribes exactly how far one must go in this e ort.… Besides, the
variety of circumstances which men may encounter makes quite optional the choice of the
kind of occupation for which one should cultivate his talent. There is here, therefore, no
law of reason for actions but only for the maxim of actions, viz., “Cultivate your powers of
mind and body so as to be able to ful ll all the ends which may arise for you, uncertain as
93

you may be which ends might become your own.”

However, such all-purpose maxims tell us nothing whatsoever about what it is moral to do in any
speci c case because we cannot know where our talent lies or how much talent we have in any
speci c area. The categorical imperative cannot tell me whether I should keep working toward a
masterpiece, switch topics often, or give up writing altogether?
Furthermore, all of this presents problems for the second formulation of the categorical
imperative. If it is a duty to "treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another,
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always as an end and never as a means only”, and if as a consequence of this we have a duty to
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develop our powers, capacities, and talents, then we are in trouble. If we cannot know what our
talents are ahead of time, and if to treat humanity as an end requires that we develop our talents
and those of others, then we will not know how to act in these cases. Again, we cannot give in to
Kantian virtue’s claim that it must be put in charge, that it can survey the whole terrain, that it
will foresee what must be done, either to direct the way of the world or even to develop our
talents by way of treating humanity as an end. Virtue must instead take a very di erent stance. It
must deal with what is, with actuality, with what has already been actualized. As Williams
suggests, it is largely retrospective. We cannot simply and easily look ahead to what Kantian
virtue claims ought to be realized.
What do we do then? Well, Hegel thinks real people just act. And he thinks Kant well
knows they do. Indeed, in his "Idea for a Universal History," Kant takes a very di erent
approach to the development of talents. He holds that it is simply self-interest that causes our
talents to develop. As in Adam Smith's model of a market society, competing particular interests
force the development of powers, capacities, and talents. Sel shness awakens our powers and
stirs us out of complacency. It moves us to action, drives us to accomplish things, and develops
96

our potential.

The way of the world and not virtue is what develops our talents.

Hegel, I suggest, thinks that Kant's approach in the Foundations is senseless and that the
view Kant presents in his "Idea for a Universal History" is correct. Within a set of
97

circumstances, our interests are formed; they lead us to action; and we realize a potential.
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the same time, Hegel is trying to develop his own view, namely, that acting, the development of
talents, is an objecti cation of the self. Only the public product, only the result, is the realization
of the talent. So also the objecti ed talent or product (the bridge or painting) must be recognized
by others. An unrecognized product means a non-objective, non-real talent—merely your own
subjective opinion that you have a talent. A talent that will never be recognized is not a real
98

talent.

We are headed for a crisis here. There is nothing to sustain a Kantian self-in-itself. We must
give up the notion of a transcendental self grounded in a beyond; we must abandon the notion of
a self that is supposed to have powers and talents that it should, but may or may not, realize.
There is no such self. It is only in and through the actual realization of powers, capacities, and
talents that a self emerges. The self emerges in its objecti cations. A self becomes real insofar
as it objecti es itself and is recognized. Our problem here is that at the level of individual
consciousness the objecti cations of the self cannot gain adequate recognition.
What we have, then, are works in which individuals have objecti ed their powers, capacities,
and talents, but which are ephemeral and unreal because other individuals nd them
unimportant—not their expression, realization, or objecti cation—and thus do not recognize
99

them.

At this point, Hegel begins to take up the notion of "die Sache selbst"— the fact itself.

Hyppolite suggests that Hegel is distinguishing between a thing of perception (Ding ) and a thing
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of spirit or culture, a human thing (Sache ).

The point that Hegel wants to move toward, I

believe, is that facts are sociocultural constructions. Individuals act, express, objectify
themselves (their powers and capacities) in a work. This is what constitutes facts. Facts are
constructs, creations, interpretations. Individual activity creates them through work, scholarship,
research, experiment, production, and so forth. Reality is a spiritual-cultural substance formed
by individual action or work.
Take the fact that "Augustus was an Emperor of Rome." This might seem to be just a simple
independently given fact. But Rome, its political institutions, and its emperors were historical
realities constructed by Romans. Without this historical construction, there would be no Rome,
no Roman emperors, and no Augustus. For the statement "Augustus was an Emperor of Rome"
to have anything beyond the most trivial meaning, we must understand what Rome was, what its
political institutions were, and what an emperor was. And to gain this understanding would
require interpretation—interpretation that we could argue about and disagree over. At a certain
point, our interpretations of our constructions may crystallize into what looks like a simple
independently given fact—the fact itself—but that is because our di erences have paled and we
have come to take these interpretations and constructions for granted.
At this point in Chapter V, then, actuality—all that is actual—is now identi ed with the
action or expression of individuals. The actual world is the action of all individuals expressing
their talents and objectifying their powers in works or acts. Consciousness (at least for us) now
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knows that it constitutes its world. In working on reality, in forming it as a product, in expressing
and objectifying our powers and talents, through research, experiment, work, and so forth, reality
is constituted by us.
The problem remaining here is that we are still at the level of individual consciousness and
thus each individual only recognizes itself in the object and only takes its own objects to be
signi cant. Others do not recognize your object nor you theirs. What Hegel calls Honest
Consciousness responds to this by holding that even if it did not bring a purpose to reality, did
not accomplish anything that others would recognize, did not build a bridge or paint a painting,
but tried, “at least willed it,” well, that is good enough. Honest Consciousness is consoled.
101

Even failure was an attempt.

As for Kant, this consciousness is not motivated by results,
102

consequences, or the actual realization of purposes.

Its concern is with its attempt, its

intention, and the fact itself.
But this leads to deceit. Honest Kantian consciousness is not as honest as it claims. Honest
Consciousness would claim not to be concerned with accomplishments and recognition but
simply with the fact itself and with trying hard—and, indeed, this too is the way others regard it.
They assume that the real issue is the work, the fact itself, regardless of who accomplished it. As
long as we all really tried, it does not matter who actually made the scienti c discovery or who
gets the recognition. Only the discovery itself really matters. Only the advance of science
matters to Honest Consciousness—not its own accomplishment or recognition. Or so it would
seem, until anyone tries to question Honest Consciousness's accomplishment. Just see what
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happens if you try to point out to Honest Consciousness that in fact you had already made this
scienti c discovery earlier, or even if you claim credit for signi cantly assisting in the discovery.
You will begin to see that Honest Consciousness has left the position where it claimed to be and
we all thought it was. It is really Honest Consciousness's own doing that concerns it—not
merely the fact itself. Honest Consciousness wants the credit for making the discovery itself.
And when others come to see that this is Honest Consciousness's real intent, they feel deceived.
However, their own haste to assist demonstrated just as much that their real concern was not
merely the fact itself either but their own desire to be in on the discovery themselves and to be
103

recognized for it. They wanted to deceive in just the way they complain of being deceived.
Consciousness is not interested in the fact itself regardless of who expresses it.

We might compare this to Kant, who, in explaining the fourth formulation of the categorical
imperative in the Foundations, argues that if we were only subject to moral laws, it would be
possible to attach ourselves to them out of self-interest—we could be motivated to obey or
disobey the law out of self-interest. But if we act as a supreme legislator, as we must, this
becomes impossible. If we were to let our interest predominate, we would be subordinating the
law (and our legislation of the law) to this interest. As legislators, then, we would not be
supreme. The law would not be supreme. Our interest would be. If we are to act as a supreme
104

legislator, then interest must go.

Hegel, we must conclude, thinks this is deceptive. Whether or not the supreme legislator is
motivated by self-interest in the sense that Kant has in mind is not the real issue because what the
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supreme legislator is very de nitely interested in is being the supreme legislator, the one who
issues the moral law. The supreme legislator is as much or more interested in its supremacy as it
is in the categorical imperative itself. What consciousness is interested in is its own doing.
Honest Consciousness is not interested in the fact itself apart from the fact that it came up with
the fact itself. Others are the same way. If they seek to assist you, they do so to get their own
piece of the action. There is a deception here. They are not simply assisting you, but trying to
manifest their own action and trying to take credit for your action. And you behave in the same
way toward them.
However, it would be a mistake to think that there is something perverse about Honest
Consciousness. Hegel is not trying to suggest that its behavior is anything but the perfectly
normal behavior of consciousness in general. If consciousness confronts any sort of truth, work,
fact, or object that is other, it has a drive to deny its otherness and claim it as its own. We can
nd consciousness doing this throughout the Phenomenology. The master claims the slave as
his own; idealism claims reality as its own; consciousness even claims to have constructed God.
Hegel's point here, I believe, is that it is a mistake to think that consciousness can or should be
concerned only with objectivity, truth, the fact itself. Consciousness, just as much, and rightfully
so, is concerned with its own doing, its involvement, its expression, its construction, its interest.
As early as the "Positivity of the Christian Religion," Hegel says that we take an interest in a
105

thing only if we can be active in its behalf.

Kantian practical reason neglects this important

and real side of consciousness. Practical reason, for Kant, cannot legitimately relate to the moral
law out of interest. Practical reason must attend to the fact itself—the moral law as an abstract
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universal. Kantian practical reason is unable to give interest and the desire for recognition a
signi cant place. We cannot act morally without subordinating our interest; we cannot act
morally from interest. Kantian morality is unable to satisfy this other legitimate side of
consciousness. Hegel's point is that Sittlichkeit will be able to do so.
And so what we have as long as we remain at the level of individual consciousness is chaos.
Each individual both wants credit for their construction, discovery, or work, yet pretends to be
concerned only with the fact itself and not their own doing, until others, as they naturally will,
begin to point out their role in the work or try to take a role by assisting, at which point the fact
itself becomes much less important than the fact that it is your own work.
Well, what if Honest Consciousness decides that it does not care about the fact itself; what if
it claims that the only thing that interests it is its own action, its own contribution, its own
work—and nothing else? Well, this will not succeed either. Our own expression, e ort, or work
simply becomes meaningless, becomes nothing, unless the fact itself is of some signi cance—of
some public signi cance. If your work is incapable of gaining any recognition, then it will do
no good for Honest Consciousness to insist that all it cares about is its own work. If this work, if
the fact itself, is insigni cant and meaningless, then Honest Consciousness has done no real
work. Both sides—your own work and the public signi cance of the fact itself—are essential.
106
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This is not to say that signi cant work never goes unrecognized. A work that is signi cant

and deserving of recognition can fail to gain that recognition. But from this we cannot conclude that
public recognition should be dismissed altogether and that all an Honest Consciousness need be
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We cannot, then, explain action simply by intention. To retreat too far into the inner life is
107

not only to try to elude responsibility for consequences, as Pippin puts it,

but it is also to strip

action of any meaning. Kenneth Westphal makes a point that is worth noting in this context.
Practical reason is inseparable from social practice. It is true that actions are carried out by
individuals, but such actions are possible and only have meaning in so far as they participate in
sociocultural practices. There are two important questions here, Westphal suggests: (1) are
individuals the only bearers of psychological states, and (2) can psychological states be
understood in individual terms? Individualists answer both questions in the a rmative, and most
holists answer both questions in the negative. Hegel, however, answers the rst question
108

a rmatively and the second negatively.

In other words, it is only individuals who act, have

intentions, construct facts, and so forth. Nevertheless, such acts, intentions, and facts cannot be
understood apart from sociocultural practices—their meaning can only be understood as
interpreted in a sociocultural context.
If that is the case, then as soon as we turn to the self and attempt to understand the individual
subject, we will nd that it too cannot be understood apart from sociocultural practices. It too
can only be understood as interpreted within a sociocultural context. While we do have
individual subjects, for Hegel, we will nd that we will not be able to hold on to the notion of a

concerned with is its own work. Its work amounts to nothing unless it deserves recognition.
Recognition is essential here.
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subject that is radically distinct from other subjects, that can stand above or outside the world,
that thus could be the source of a virtue that could guide the way of the world, that could be a
supreme legislator, or that could be committed purely to the fact itself. In short, we do not have a
Kantian subject, a subject that could alone be the source of a categorical imperative. Instead, we
will have to develop a di erent conception of a subject—one embedded in a context of cultural
practices, meanings, objecti cations, and recognition.

VI
In the nal two sections of Chapter V, "Reason as Lawgiver" and "Reason as Testing Laws," we
take up an analysis of Kant's categorical imperative that is direct and explicit enough to be clear
to all readers. Here we have a Kantian consciousness, a supreme lawgiver, that takes itself to be
109

absolute, universal, and authoritative.

It would claim to be the true and absolute ethical

authority, but Hegel will try to show us that it is not, that this is only possible if we move to
Sittlichkeit, and that all that Kant can give us is the same old Honest Consciousness who really
110

tries but always fails.

At any rate, for Kant, practical reason claims to know immediately what is right and good
and to be able to issue determinate laws accordingly. As Kant puts it in the Metaphysical
Principles of Virtue,
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An imperative is a practical rule by which an action, in itself contingent, is made
necessary.… a rule whose representation makes a subjectively contingent action necessary
and therefore represents the subject as one who must be constrained (necessitated) to
conform to this rule. The categorical (unconditional) imperative is one that does not
command mediately … but immediately, through the mere representation of this action
itself (its form), which is thought through the categorical imperative as objectively
necessary …
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Let us see if Kantian practical reason can, as it claims, give us laws that make subjectively
contingent actions objective, immediate, unconditional, and necessary. Let us take an example of
112

such a law: "'Everyone ought to speak the truth.'"

Well, as Hegel points out, the condition

will at once have to be admitted: if you know the truth. The law, then, would have to be stated:
everyone ought to speak the truth in so far as they know it. But,

with this admission, it in fact admits that already, in the very act of saying the
commandment, it really violates it. It said: everyone ought to speak the truth; but it
meant: he ought to speak it according to his knowledge and conviction; that is to say, what
it said was di erent from what it meant; and to speak otherwise than one means, means not
speaking the truth. The untruth or inapt expression in its improved form now runs:
everyone ought to speak the truth according to his knowledge and conviction at the time.
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But with this correction, what the proposition wanted to enunciate as universally necessary
and intrinsically valid, has really turned round into something completely contingent. For
speaking the truth is made contingent on whether I can know it, and can convince myself of
it; and the proposition says nothing more than that a confused muddle of truth and
113

falsehood ought to be spoken just as anyone happens to know, mean, and understand it.

We do not have anything unconditional, necessary, or objective here, but merely good old
Honest Consciousness still trying its subjective best. We might further change the proposition by
adding that the truth ought to be known, but then we would contradict our original assumption
that practical reason knows the truth immediately. We would be admitting that it does not
actually know what is true—it merely ought to know it. This is not unconditional and objective
morality; it is merely subjective and intended.
114

Take the commandment: "'Love thy neighbor as thyself.'"

Such love would at least

require, Hegel suggests, that we work to remove evil and do good for our neighbor. And that
would mean that to love my neighbor intelligently I would have to know what is good and bad.
Unintelligent love might well do my neighbor harm. We are slipping toward the subjectivity of
Honest Consciousness again. At any rate, Hegel argues that the agency most capable of avoiding
evil and accomplishing intelligent good for my neighbor would be the just state, in comparison to
which what any single individual is likely to accomplish is minimal. Furthermore, the action of
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the state is so pervasive that if I as an individual in trying to bene t my neighbor were to oppose
the state in a way that was either intended to be criminal or (like the friends of Honest
Consciousness) was simply an attempt to cheat the state of its due credit in order to claim it for
myself, such action would most likely be frustrated and rendered useless. While there is room
for individual bene cence in single, isolated, contingent situations, generally speaking, the
socio-cultural-political world is such a pervasive power that doing good of the sort that Kant
envisions, that is, the doing good of an autonomous individual consciousness, certainly cannot
realistically be demanded necessarily and unconditionally. Such action is too easily swept aside
or rendered meaningless. Whether the act will be a work that bene ts the neighbor as intended,
or be immediately undone, or twisted and perverted by circumstance into harm, is a matter of
chance—certainly when we are dealing with the way of the world, this race of devils that only
appears as a nation of angels. It cannot meaningfully be demanded necessarily and
unconditionally that we act for the good of others if it will always be contingent whether any act,
depending upon whether it accords with the state or not, will be erased or reinforced, distorted or
maintained, turned into its opposite or left as it is. It is as likely to be possible as not. We have
not moved very far beyond fate to rationally ordered providence—we have chance here, not
universality and necessity. If one objects that Kantian morality should not be motivated by
concern for such consequences or contexts, the answer must be that it cannot then do good to its
neighbor in any morally signi cant way. In the Foundations, Kant argues that:

An action performed from duty does not have its moral worth in the purpose which is to be
achieved through it but in the maxim by which it is determined. Its moral value, therefore,
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does not depend on the realization of the object of the action but merely on the principle of
volition by which the action is done, without any regard to the objects of the faculty of
desire.… Wherein, then, can this worth lie if it is not in the will in relation to its hoped-for
e ect? It can lie nowhere else than in the principle of the will, irrespective of the ends
115

which can be realized by such action.

We are back to good old Honest Consciousness who has at least tried, or, as Hegel puts it,
“[i]f this consciousness does not convert its purpose into a reality, it has at least willed it, i.e. it
makes the purpose qua purpose, the mere doing which does nothing … and can therefore
explain and console itself with the fact that all the same something was taken in hand and done.”
116

We do not have a consciousness capable of giving us an objective, unconditional, immediate,
and necessary law here. Its law “does not express, as an absolute ethical law should, something
117

that is valid in and for itself”; its laws “stop at Ought, they have no actuality … “

Kantian

practical reason does not give us laws; it merely issues commandments.
What does it mean to say that we do not have a law, but merely a commandment? In the
Foundations, Kant claims that we can derive the fourth formulation of the categorical
imperative, namely, a kingdom of ends, from the fact that we must consider each individual to be
a supreme lawgiver. A kingdom of ends is a union of rational beings in a system of common
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laws.

In other words, Kant is claiming that individual practical reason gives us all we need

from which to derive the state and its laws. From supreme lawgivers, each obeying only laws
they give themselves, we can derive the system of laws that make up the state. Hegel denies that
individual consciousness can give us the sorts of laws we have or need in a state.
The sorts of laws that Hegel thinks we need are not grounded in the will of particular
individuals. Laws must have their own intrinsic being—they must exist in and for themselves.
This is not to say that laws are not constructed. Even God is constructed for Hegel. And the fact
that laws are constructed by citizens will be essential if we are to be free. But the law is not
constructed by individual consciousness. It does not have its source in individual Kantian
practical reason. It is the work of all, of a community, a culture, a nation. Laws are rooted in and
grow out of the customs, traditions, and practices of a people and are tied to their social and
public institutions, their public values, their philosophy, religion, and art. Such laws are not
subjective and contingent; they are objective, unconditional, and necessary—they are true and
absolute.
Let us see if we can understand and make at least a reasonably plausible case for the sorts of
laws that Hegel is after. Consider the example of a state and its educational system. In Hegel
view, the state would expect that its professors teach the truth. We need not conclude that this
will threaten academic freedom. Even if the state were a paradigm of respect for academic
freedom, it would still assume, at least, that its professors did not knowingly and systematically
teach falsehood. Even further, Hegel would hold, it will also expect these professors to know the
truth, at the very least, in the sense that it would be fraudulent for the university to hire professors
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who have not undergone the proper training and engaged in serious study, whose only credentials
were that they were enthusiastic about their opinions and sincere in their intentions. So when the
university hires professors of engineering or art it does not merely expect them like Honest
Consciousness to try their best. It expects them to actually be able to build real bridges and paint
real paintings and to teach others how to do so. We hold professors responsible for actually
doing these things, not just for trying. So also we expect the university to give its students an
education that will (assuming a just society) t them for life in the state, prepare them for a
vocation, and give them the moral and scienti c knowledge needed for these purposes. We
expect this at least in the sense that were the university systematically to fail to do so we would
conclude that it was not functioning properly. The law has a right to require more than that the
university try. It is expected to succeed.
What we need and have in culture, Hegel thinks, is far richer and more powerful than mere
subjective Kantian oughts. Sittlichkeit does not merely tell us that we ought to educate our
children or do good to our neighbors, it gives us an understanding of what things like good to our
neighbor and proper education actually are and it embeds them in our customs, traditions,
practices, and institutions so that we are able to act in the world and actually do act accordingly.
It enables us not just to try or to will, but to succeed, and to pass this knowledge and ability on to
others. It gives us much more than an ought—it gives us actuality.
What we must see is that Sittlichkeit is missing in Kant’s thought and that we need it to
account for our experience. A true law must grow up and be rooted in a community, in its
customs, traditions, and practices. It must be a force that morally empowers its citizens. It is not
enough (which is to say, for Hegel, it is not ethically enough) that it merely oblige them morally,
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that it be a mere maxim that can be universalized, that it merely be willed. But that is enough to
119

establish its “moral value” for Kant, as he himself says.

And so Kantian reason is not a

lawgiver. At best it is a test of laws.

VII
But even as a test of laws, Kant's ethics fail. In taking up a given content in order to test it, to see
if it is universalizable, we nd, at least in some important cases, that one content will work as
well as its opposite. If you ask, for example, whether there should be private property, you will
nd private property to be perfectly self-consistent—you can universalize it without
contradiction. But you can just as well universalize the absence of private property—a
120

community of goods or communism. That involves no contradiction either.

Singer, in his by now classic criticism, claims that Hegel is “almost incredibly
simple-minded” here. It seems to me, however, that Singer misses Hegel’s point entirely.
According to Singer, Hegel should be able to see that,

if everyone stole, whenever and whatever he pleased, there would be no such thing as
property and hence the purpose of stealing would be made impossible.… Yet [Hegel] seems
utterly confused as to why it would therefore be wrong to steal.… Kant’s point … is a
relatively simple one, which is perhaps why the profundities of Hegel are so far from the
mark. It could not be willed to be a universal law that everyone could steal whenever he
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wished to, for if everyone stole whenever he wished to, or took for his own anything he
happened to want, there would be no property and hence nothing to steal—there would be
nothing he could call his own. Stealing presupposes that there is such a thing as
property—something to be stolen …

121

Singer so little understands Hegel’s criticism of Kant that the last line of this passage,
intended to undermine Hegel, in fact concedes Hegel’s point against Kant. Hegel thinks that in
formulating a maxim the Kantian presupposes a certain form of property as given and that only
with this presupposition will the principle of universalization work. Unless we know what sort
of property is right in a given culture—and universalization alone will not tell us—we cannot
know what would constitute an act of theft and what would not. For example, suppose I enter a
store, pocket an article of consumption without putting down any money, and walk o . Was that
theft or not? Was it immoral or not? Asking whether the maxim can be universalized will not
tell me. If I live in a market economy with private property, the act was theft. If I live in a
communist society based upon the principle "to each according to their need," it was not theft.
Both private property and communism are equally universalizable. Universalizability will not
decide the issue. We must have a cultural world with cultural content given to us. Either private
property or communism must be given as right before we can go on to decide what constitutes an
act of theft. We need Sittlichkeit, that is, settled and given customs, traditions, and
practices—we need culture—for morality to be possible.
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Singer basically has Hegel’s argument backwards. He makes the common but mistaken
claim that in Hegel’s view the categorical imperative is empty and contentless, "Hegel assumes
that the categorical imperative is supposed to be applied in a vacuum … that Kant’s ethics is an
'empty formalism.'" Hegel, in Singer’s view, does not see that if "someone proposes to adopt a
certain maxim, or to act in a certain way in certain circumstances in order to achieve a certain
purpose, then we … 'already possess a content,' to which the categorical imperative can be
122

applied."

This is not what Hegel is saying. Hegel is not denying that the categorical

imperative has a content in Singer’s sense; Hegel fully accepts that in formulating a maxim we
take up a content. He says explicitly in the Phenomenology that what we have is a “standard for
deciding whether a content is capable of being a law or not,” and he goes on to talk about content
123

at least three times in the next page.

Moreover, Hegel well knows that adopting a maxim

commits the person to an act or an end. After all, as we have seen, one of Hegel’s criticisms of
the categorical imperative is that it gives us an ought— for Hegel it is a mere ought rather than
an is— but nevertheless it does give us an ought (it gives us a commandment, though not a law).
The problem here stems, I think, from misinterpreting the following passage from Hegel’s
Philosophy of Right,
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The Proposition: ‘Act as if the maxim of thine action could be laid down as a universal
principle’, would be admirable if we already had determinate principles of conduct. That is
to say, to demand of a principle that it shall be able to serve in addition as a determinant of
universal legislation is to presuppose that it already possesses a content. Given the content,
124

then of course the application of the principle would be a simple matter.

Singer takes the implication of this passage to be that we do not have a content, that the
categorical imperative is contentless. But that is not the point the passage is making at all. The
point is that for the categorical imperative to work we must be given a content—in the sense of a
determinant principle of conduct. In other words, our culture has to tell us, for example, that
private property is right. Once we have this, Hegel is saying, then the categorical imperative
will have no di culty in telling us that walking o with the article from the store was theft.
Hegel is not claiming that the categorical imperative has no content. He is claiming that it will
not work without content. Where does the content come from? It is certainly not generated out
of the categorical imperative itself. It is taken up from culture—it is given by culture as right.
Private property must be given as right before we can see that what we did in the store was theft.
Hegel makes this point very clearly in the Philosophy of Right,

The absence of property contains in itself just as little contradiction as the non-existence
of this or that nation, family, &c., or the death of the whole human race. But if it is already
established on other grounds and presupposed that property and human life are to exist and
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be respected, then indeed it is a contradiction to commit theft or murder; a contradiction
must be a contradiction of something, i.e. of some content presupposed from the start as a
125

xed principle.

The argument against Kant, then, is not that the categorical imperative is contentless. The
argument is that the categorical imperative presupposes it content; it takes up its content
uncritically. The Kantian formulating a maxim concerning theft assumes that private property is
given. As Hegel puts it in the Phenomenology, “Laws are … tested; and for the consciousness
which tests them they are already given. It takes up their content simply as it is, without
concerning itself … with the particularity and contingency inherent in its reality … its attitude
126

towards it is just as uncomplicated as is its being a criterion for testing it.”

Perhaps this point is made most clearly in the Natural Law essay, though Hegel overstates
his point in this early essay. He says,

[i]f this formalism is to be able to promulgate a law, some matter, something speci c, must
be posited to constitute the content of the law. And the form given to this speci c matter is
unity or universality. “That a maxim of thy will shall count at the same time as a principle
of universal legislation”—this basic law of pure practical reason expresses the fact that
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something speci c, constituting the content of the maxim of the particular will, shall be
posited as concept, as universal. But every speci c matter is capable of being clothed with
the form of the concept … there is nothing whatever which cannot in this way be made into
127

a moral law.

While Hegel is overstating his case in holding that anything can be made into a moral law,
nevertheless, his basic point is that di erent cultures can and have established very di erent
things as moral laws—very di erent forms of property, for example. And it is obvious that quite
consistent social organizations can be built around such di erent laws. The principle of
universalization is not going to show us that all but one of these forms of property and social
organization are contradictory; there will at least be many di erent forms of property and social
organization that it will not show to be contradictory. The categorical imperative, then, will not
tell us which of these forms of property is right. Only after we are given one of these forms of
property as right can the categorical imperative begin to tell us what would be an act of theft and
what would not.
Hegel is not out to junk the categorical imperative. He is simply claiming that a certain
content must be given for it to work, a content which in his view Kant naively presupposes. This
content is given by culture and thus morality needs a theory of culture. Hegel is trying to drive
us toward Sittlichkeit. Furthermore, Hegel is not out to junk universalizability. In Hegel’s view,
universalizability is necessary for morality; it is just that it does not amount to morality. Acting

127

Natural Law, trans. T.M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975),

76-77 and, for the German, GW, IV, 436.

Hegel’s Critique of Kantian Practical Reason

on a categorical imperative—in so far as that means acting merely on what reason tells us is
universalizable—is not enough to be moral. As Hegel puts it, something is not right because it is
128

non-contradictory; "it is right because it is what is right."

Let us see if we can even better explain the sort of moral law that Hegel is after. For Hegel,
we can fail in two ways. If we have a real law, the sort that Hegel wants, an absolute, not a mere
commandment or an ought, then this law cannot be issued by a single person or an individual
consciousness. That would turn the law into something tyrannical and it would turn obedience to
such a law into something slavish. On the other hand, while Kantian testing of laws certainly
gives us freedom from such laws, which are rejected as alien and heteronomous, nevertheless it
129

leaves us with individual consciousness and the loss of an absolute grounding.

Hegel wants to

avoid both of these extremes.
What Hegel wants in a law is that it be valid in and for itself. It must not be grounded in the
will of particular individuals. In obeying such laws, self-consciousness must not in any way be
subordinating itself to a master whose commands are alien and arbitrary. Self-consciousness
must nd these laws to be "the thoughts of its own absolute consciousness, thoughts which are
130

immediately its own."

We construct these laws; we issue them; but as participating in a

cultural consciousness, the consciousness of a people or nation, not as individual
consciousnesses. These laws are not arbitrary, tyrannical, or alien. They are not heteronomous.
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They are my own laws. I am free in obeying them. But I also recognize them as universal,
objective, absolute, the will of all, the will of my people.
Self-consciousness does not even believe in its laws. Belief in something suggests that the
believer is an individual consciousness and that what it believes in is alien to it. For Hegel we
131

should be immediately one with our laws.

It is not enough to merely believe in them. Laws

must be so rooted in the customs and practices of my culture that I simply know them. They are
facts. They are true. They are absolute. Is this really so strange? I suggest that we do not
merely believe that murder, for example, is wrong. We certainly do not need, in order to know
that it is wrong, to engage in a subjective process of analysis, a deduction, like asking whether
132

murder can be universalized without contradiction.

To suggest that we must is to miss

something fundamental about morality. It is to subjectivize something that is absolute. Hegel's
concept of Sittlichkeit wants to avoid heteronomy and give us freedom, but without losing the
absolute.
We must move to culture, where ethical content has an objective being of its own, where it is
not just subjective rationality that decides what is moral as for Kant. Things are not moral
simply because my rationality nds them to be moral. They are objectively moral—moral
in-themselves. Yet this objective moral content is not something other, alien to consciousness,
heteronomous, as Kant would think. It is the construction of consciousness. Think of the
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Athenian assembly creating its own laws—laws which grow out of and are reinforced by custom
and tradition, the myths and the gods, and thus are objective, absolute, ethical in-themselves for
the people they form. Only Sittlichkeit is capable of bringing all of the elements of the ethical
together: (1) subjective passion, interest, engagement, involvement; (2) all located in a cultural
context in which we are at home, which we nd to be our own, all constructed by the citizens
themselves, where we are thus free; which (3) at the same time grows out of and is reinforced by
custom and tradition, public institutions, art, religion, and philosophy, the objective and absolute
values, ends, and purposes of a nation; and (4) within this context the citizens re ect rationally
and establish universal laws. In such a context, citizens know and accomplish—they live in and
are a part of—the ethical. Ethical life exists; it empowers its citizens; it pervades and is actually
played out in their lives and practices. It is not a mere ought.
To fully justify Hegel's ethical views would require that we say much more about Sittlichkeit,
but that is a task for another paper. Our task here has been to show that Hegel's critique of
Kantian ethics is much more powerful and thorough than has been recognized by those who fail
to see that Hegel criticizes Kant's ethics throughout a large part of Chapter V of the
Phenomenology, not just in the last two sections. Defenders of Kant often want to claim that
Hegel has not understood Kant or that Hegel attacks a crudely understood Kant. I hope I have
shown that Hegel understands Kant in a rather sophisticated way, thinks Kant is wrong, and does
a reasonable job of arguing against Kant. Moreover, it seems to me that many Kantians can be
accused of misunderstanding Hegel, and once they begin to understand him, they will nd
arguments against Kant that, whether they can nally be answered or not, certainly cannot
simply be dismissed as mere misunderstandings of Kant.
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